

safety bulletin

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Dear Colleagues,

The unexpected and shocking death of Phil Faulkner, the leader of Safety in the operational area, certainly not only left thoughts with me but many of us probably had a «stop» while thinking about Phil. We would like to express our sincere condolence to his relatives. We would like to thank Phil again for his engagement in Safety, an enterprise which has no beginning and no end but that accompanies us as an everlasting process.



Since I am responsible for Skyguide Corporate Safety and the more knowledge I attain of the complex structure in this business, the clearer also appear to me the key issues in organizational safety. It is seen historically absolutely understandably that both major units – Operations

and Technics- organized their safety in accordance with their specific needs. Subsequently to the tragic accident the Corporate Safety was reinforced and today three hardly connected safety-related bodies exist in a firm with less than 1500

employees. Although the responsibilities are defined, the present configuration hardly enables a safety culture to develop through coherence and trust.

With this background I undertook the task to deal with this safety fragmentation, a seminar is foreseen soon to address these primordial organizational issues. To this purpose, we invited the renown professor Erik Hollnagel who can challenge us from an outsider's perspective. Certainly the purpose is to retain the strengths while eliminating the weaknesses, to identify redundancies and if possible to establish a uniform thinking towards Safety. This process will obviously comprise all the concerned Stakeholders. Despite the fact that we now miss the head of

operational Safety and that the technical Safety organization is assessed by PWC, there should be no hindrance to prospective work. Obviously we will keep in touch with the current state of affairs.

*JUERG SCHMID,
Company safety manager*

Electronic submission of SIR and OIR

The SIR (safety improvement report) and the OIR (operational internal report) are now available for electronic submission that enable an easy access and filling of the forms. Safety management (DS) strongly encourages the use of these forms as they accelerate the process.

When a report is submitted electronically the SODA database directly receives and stores the information and, in case of OIR, instantaneously distributes it to appropriate staff within skyguide while respecting confidentiality. The access to names is restricted to people working for the safety management unit (DS), except when in the case of SIR the reporter chooses not to remain confidential (an OIR is always submitted confidentially).

It has to be reminded here to be truthful that the OIR reports that fall into the «safety of aircraft compromised» category can not remain confidential as the law gives the access to names to the authorities (Federal Office for Civil Aviation and the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau). On the other hand SIR information will always remain entirely internal to skyguide.

The provisions for this tools are all explained in the processes described in skyline and you will find the links later in the article. To ease the reading here is a brief recap of the objectives of the OIR and SIR reporting processes.

OIR objectives

- to ensure that all ATM-occurrences are systematically and properly assessed within the company and that appropriate internal corrective measures are taken and recorded.
- to ensure that safety recommendations issued by the AAIB, the FOCA and the Air Force are properly implemented, to keep record and to provide internal feedback and to the regulator about their implementation
- to ensure that all ATM-occurrence reports are handled in a single, uniform and transparent manner within skyguide

ATM Occurrence management

(click to follow the link to full process description)

SIR objectives

- Improve overall Safety
- Encourage voluntary reporting of safety-related problems in operational and technical units.
- Implement remedial actions for safety-related problems in operational and technical units.

Safety Improvement Reporting Process

(click to follow the link to full process description)

When should I use an OIR and when should I use a SIR?

The OIR has to be used in case of an occurrence, meaning that something has actually happened. The SIR has to be used to signify any safety relevant problem, however no incident

has happened due to this so far.

Examples for SIR:

- malfunctioning of equipment
- problems with procedures,
- insufficient training,
- workload,
- safety-relevant problems with colleagues, superiors or other units

Examples for OIR:


- Any Accidents
- Incidents like:
 - Separation minima infringement
 - Inadequate separation
 - Runway incursion

- Aircraft deviation from ATC clearance
- Unauthorised penetration of airspace
- Any other incident

How to access the electronic forms

The way to the forms is the following, open *skyline*: go to issues; *safety* and then the forms will appear on the top of the right column (see picture 1)

The previous paper forms are still available, as well as the AIM OIR.



Picture 1


► Electronic submission of SIR and OIR

When filling in the OIR form the fields that do absolutely need to be filled in are in red, when you are ready to submit your report you can first print it (see bottom of picture 2) and then you can submit it. If you did not fill in the form appropriately the red warning message will appear: please provide value for fields in red. In the case beside the date has been entered in the wrong format: it needs to be 11:45 and not 11h45 or 11.45 or whatever else. You will be aware if the report has been delivered properly if the following message appears on the screen:

*«Your report has now been sent to the DSO department
Thank you for your contribution, you will receive a feed-back very soon.
The SODA Manager»*

It has to be said here moreover that due to database features if you leave the form without making any inputs during 20 minutes or more the data you typed in will be lost.

THOMAS NOVOTNY
DS-5, Safety management



Picture 2

Distortions on Frequencies

History:

On 14th November 2005, an A320 was flying within Geneva airspace. As the aircraft was passing abeam and over the radio transmitters, distortions on the frequency were generated.

After this incident a letter was sent by skyguide to Aeroflot's safety officer, but somehow the communication ended there.

On 4th December 2006, the same flight was flying through Geneva airspace. When the pilot radioed in on INI frequency, a loud beep was audible every 5 seconds on all GVA frequencies.



These interferences can scramble clearances and read backs and in a busy environment, it may result in an increase of workload, e.g in the case where controllers and/or crews have to repeat their messages.

After the initial analysis made by skyguide, it became clear, that in both incidents the same aircraft was involved. However this time

skyguide asked FOCA to write a letter to Aeroflot's safety officer to inform him about the problem and see if any corrective measures could be taken. After reception of the letter, the safety officer called FOCA to discuss the nature of the problem. Following this communication we were informed, that a meeting had been held between Aeroflot, Airbus and Eurocontrol to find a remedy to the deficiencies of the radio sets.

The additional objective of this meeting was to make a complete survey of VHF COM interferences induced by this type of equipment. As these interferences were observed

within several areas (MUAC, Belgo-control, CRNA and skyguide), it was discovered that some of the receivers on the ground (amongst which the ones used by skyguide) react in a particularly sensitive way to FM signal modulation (pure squelch) done by this type of transmitters.

The current status is, that the software of all radio sets has been updated. We would like to express her our gratitude to all people who made us aware of the problem and allowed the removal of the hazard from the system.

*ELKE SCHAFFER
DSO Geneva*

safety bulletin Job offer

You are a licensed ATCO working at INI sectors in Geneva and you are interested by incident investigations?

Then the safety unit needs you! Concretely the job consists in helping the corporate occurrence investigation unit (DSO) in the conduct of investigations of incidents that might help the company to open its eyes on the issues that you might uncover.

The job is 40% for DSO and the rest as a standard operational ATCO. If you are interested in digging into human factors and going beyond the human error to find a bit more about the full picture then do not hesitate, apply! If you feel like having the skill of interviewing and getting the most possible information from your peers in the aftermath of an incident then the job is done for you!

The investigator for TCG is presently Michel Masserey and it is Marcian Tessin who is responsible for the UAC West. These two investigators are certainly the people you need to talk to should you be interested in the task. Otherwise Tom Laursen (DSO) or Thomas Novotny (DS-S) will also be happy to answer to your questions.


Polyvalent ATCO

An A321 was on the way from Malpensa to Paris CDG while a B738 was coming from Spain bound for Nürnberg. The A321 made the initial call while passing FL250 for FL260. Having reached FL260, the flight crew requested FL380 for cruise. The ATCO had to coordinate a higher level with the next sector.

Later on, the A321 was cleared to proceed direct to Hochwald VOR and to climb initially to FL310. The B738 was approaching from their left-hand side descending to FL320 inbound to DITON. The ATCO gave a new route clearance to ROMIR and then LOKTA.

The ATCO was then relieved by another ATCO who was up to then working at the collapsed Sector M3/M4 and now moved to the working position of Sector M2, in order to take over the traffic and at the same time to collapse the Sectors U, M2, M3 and M4. The A321 requesting FL380 was part of the handover, where the new arrived ATCO started to gain an overview of the actual traffic situation. As aircraft were already calling on the frequency, he focused on the traffic on the screen leaving him no time to have an ample view onto the strips.

Less than two minutes after the handover, the STCA was triggered. While the ATCO was busy handling other traffic, the attention was drawn to both aircraft. Being used to the STCA in Geneva, which is triggered at a very late stage, and having the handover talk in the



back of his mind that he still has «to do something» with AFR2215 and BER3995, the ATCO was convinced to be confronted with a veritable conflict. His reaction was to clear the B738 to descend to FL290. The A321 (in his mind cleared FL320) is instructed to turn to MOROK and to continue the climb to FL340 in order to avoid the imagined conflict. The «Zurich-STCA» showed a conflict even if there was none. The system has insufficient parameters to know about the situation changing around it and so proceeds with the pre-programmed routine.

The ATCO issued a traffic information. The pilot of the A321 answered with «Traffic in sight, stopping climb».

...with hindsight...

With hindsight we know that the flight progress strip of AFR2215 with the cleared level was on the board. Although the cleared flight level is physically available on the strip, this does not mean that a controller automatically picks it up in a high work load and time constraint situation. While working at the Geneva site, the ATCO was confronted with a strip-less system.

Like in most incidents happening in complex systems, there is no root cause for this incident. Several circumstances/factors emerged from the investigation (handover, mindset, high traffic load). One in particular was the difference in systems and working methods between

Geneva and Zurich suggesting to reconsider the continuation of the PAT programme. A number of controllers are not ready to work at both sites alternately. The involved ATCO could firstly not see a problem in working in Geneva and in Zurich. But after this incident he changed his opinion.

Should you wish to learn more about the case please follow this skyline link to the full internal investigation

[link to full investigation report in skyline](#)

CLAUDIO DI PALMA
DSO Zurich

The Daily Infringer

Every Day

Cost : A Lot of Hassle

BOTHERED BY INFRINGERS?



Please fill in a Safety Report